Chicago-Kent Law Review
Volume 5

Issue 4

Article 9

January 1927

Black Stones
William G. Wood
J. Bertram Levie

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
William G. Wood & J. B. Levie, Black Stones, 5 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 23 (1927).
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol5/iss4/9

This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT
Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu,
ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu.

THE CHICAGO-KENT REVIEW

BLACK STONES
Lord Coke, Conductor
THAT OUGHT TO HELP
AIMEE
LOS ANGELES,
NOVEMBER 14
J K W CHICAGO
ORMISTON HAS FOLLOWING AD
IN PAPER HERE QUOTE I HAVE
NOT BEEN IN CALIFORNIA OR
ELSEWHERE SINCE JUNE UNQUOTE ANSWER
WATSON
The trouble with Christmas is that it
comes too close to the Yule holidays.

Dear Conductor: My wife tells me
that she patronizes a butcher with an
eye to advertising.
You've heard this
stfiff about "milk from contented cows?"
Well, the butcher advertises, "sausages
from pigs that died happy."
-GEO. METRY.
Wonderful wife, Geo., but she must
have told Bud Fisher before she told
you!
A GOOD MAN KEEPS HITTING
THE
BULL'S
EYE
WITHOUT
SHOOTING THE BULL.

-BARBARA.
The reason some girls' hair looks like
mops is because some girls don't know
what mops look like.

NEWSPAPER HEADLINES
MAN WHO DIED ON STREET IS
REPORTED RECOVERING
WALWORTH COUNTY FARMER
DROPS HEAD WHILE PLOWING
EDUCATED WOMEN HAVE HARD
TIME MARRYING, SAYS FEMINIST
IN DISCUSSING THE PROBLEM

YOU NEEDN'T RUB IT IN
A fool there was and he saved his
rocks, even as you and I; but he took
them out of the old strong box when a
salesman called with some wild-cat
stocks and the fool was stripped down
to his socks, even as you and I.
GRAB BED.
0, MAGGIE!
HOUSEKEEPER WANTED-At once,
under 40.. Four gentlemen alone in country, one light in weight who wants an
easy place; widow preferred. If not in
want of situation don't answer. Address
0 X, care News, Bangor, Me.

UNSELFISH ADVERTISING
Every housewife should have two savings accounts-one at a reliable bank
and one at this savings institution.-Ad
in New York World.

FRONT AND CENTER!
"Larry" Willett, Business Extension,
tells the conductor of this colyum that
he knows a girl who paints and she certainly can draw MEN.

CRUST, I CALLS IT, AL
M.y gawd, J. K., this fellow Hankins
is swiping the bootleggers' stuff!
NOTICE-Having installed city water I
can easily increase my customers for
milk a 100. See R. W. Hankins, Phone
463.-Alva, Okla., Daily Courier-Review.
-PUSSYFOOT
AL.
Send in your contributions-one and
all.
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ATTENTION!

The Senior Class Promenade
OF

CHICAGO KENT COLLEGE OF LAW
WILL BE HELD ON

FEBRUARY 5, 1927
AT

THE EDGEWATER BEACH HOTEL
BLACK CAT ROOM
Tunes Will Be Manufactured
By Windy City Pirates

BIDS $3.00
Per Couple
OF COURSE I'M GOING

SOCIETY ITEM
Announcing-Announcing
The

Snappiest,

Peppiest, Most

Luxurious Dance Ever

Given!!!

That's what the Senior Promenade will
be. This long looked for event will be
pulled off at the Edgewater Beach Hotel,
Black Cat Room, on February 5, 1927.
Nobody should go unless they want to
have a good time. Those who don't expect to, will be disappointed, and we
don't care if they are; they're warned in
advance. And the music-Ah!-the music-it is the best conglomeration of perfect harmony ever offered to the good
old Chicago Kent crowd. The Windy
City Pirates-that's the name of it, and
it produces the most glorious jazz obtainable. It is something different, this
dance; it's at a different place, there is
different music, and best of all, it is after
the exams, so you will have nothing on
your minds.

How can you afford to miss it? There
may never be another opportunity like
this. Secure you tickets whi'2 they last,
from members of the senior class. Signed,
Edelstein,
Washer, Tews,
Pomeroy,
committee.

SENIOR PRESIDENT
A NNO UNCES
APPOINTMENTS
Those who are to have charge of the
business and social activities of the class
of June 1927 have just been appointed
by President John Loughnane:
Officers.
John M.
John H.
Howard
James J.

Long-Prophet.
Clausen-Historian.
Deming-Poet.
Smejkal-Orator.

Transcript.
Tyrell Krum-Editor.
Donald R. Murray-Associate Editor.
Richard Lefebure-Associate Editor.
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Amos Case-Associate Editor.
Louis Pfohl-Business Manager.
Willis Gale-Assistant Manager.
James T. Cunnea-Picture Editor.
H. M. Keele-Fiction Editor.
Esther Johnson-Art Editor.
E. H. Felt-Activities.
Stephen Szwajkart-Fraternities.
Isabelle Adden-Sorority.
Paul Jones-Post Graduate
R. Robert Fischer-Mid-Year Seniors.
Arthur McGinnis-Seniors.
Donald Bulger-Juniors.
E. Gritzbangh-Freshmen.
William Nclson-Faculty Editor.
Entertainment Committee.
Roy Ross, Chairman; Joseph Colitz.
Clyde Larish, Louis Zuttermeister.
Cap and Gown.
Richard Hill, Chairman; A. A. Petroshius, Sam Barth, Gray Phelps.
Invitation and Program.
H. J. Perry, Chairman; Frank Chernaukes, William Fischer.
Picture.
James T. Cunnea, Chairman; Albert H.
Jacoby, Louis Smith.
Scramble.
Howard
Chairman;
Carl Holmes,
White, Hugh Bailey, Clinton Thompson,
Sam Endler.
Social.
Richard Bierdcnan, Chairman; Robert
Darlington, Edmund Mansure, John
Wood, I. N. Haskell.

Kent-Loyola

E.

E.

Bridges,

Smoker.
Ostrom, Chairnman;
Edward

Jensen,

Peter
1.

Thoaas, William Robinson.
Banquet.

Harold Sharp, Chairman; N. W. Bullard, M. L Hill.
Constitutional.
Chairman;
Libman,
Solomon
Broccolo, Palmer Leren.

Paul

Prof. Wood (calling on Freshman
Zeidman for the first time): "By the
way, are you related to the Mr. Zeidman
who was a Senior last year?"
Zeidman: "Did he graduate?"
"Right"
Freshmen please note:
"rite" are not synonymous.

and

No, Mr. Kravitz, "corpus juris" does
not mean "dead jury."
Prof. Wood (explaining the case of
Wolford vs. Powers, where it was held
to be a detriment for a father to promise
to name his infant son after the father's
"The promise need not be
uncle):
shown to have benefitted the uncle. The
absence of a benefit to the uncle would
not have been a defense to his administrator. In such cases, benefit is immaIn fact, sometimes it might be
terial.
positively embarrassing to a man to have
some one else's child named after him."

Barber Shop

8 North Franklin Street
HAIR CUTTING and SHINGLING
OUR SPECIALTY
DEARBORN

Ray

2676
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FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
OF THE STATUTE OF
FRAUDS

The first important thing to note is,
that in no jurisdiction are such statutes
part of the criminal code, and that therefore contracts falling within the Statute,
and not complying with its requirements,
No single subject relating to the gen- are never held to be illegal. In fact,
eral law of contracts is fraught with
it requires very strong language to jusmore difficulty to the student, and even
tify the holding that they are even void;
to the average practitioner, than the
and nearly every state holds that its
question of the applicability of the, Statute of Frauds does no more than imStatute of Frauds, the results of such
pose an additional evidentiary requireapplicability, and the circumstances under
ment prerequisite to its enforceability in
which it can be avoided.
court. Whenever this is held, it would
seem that the Statute should be held to
It is not within the scope of this arbe retroactive, for its affects only the
ticle to discuss in detail the different
remedy, and not the substantive rights
classes of contracts to which it applies,
of the parties; but whenever the Statute
nor the compliance therewith by the prois held to render such agreements void,
duction of a proper memorandum, but
it is of course a rule of substantive, not
it is designed herein to discuss briefly
the general principles applicable to ill adjective, law, and is not applicable to
any contracts made prior to its enactcases which fall within its scope, and
ment.
which are not sufficiently evidenced by
a memo.
The Statute applies to all express conHistorically, it is sufficient to mention
tracts, and to all contracts implied in
briefly the turbulent times preceding the
fact, from the conduct of the parties, in
enactment of this well-known act by the
which an executory promise of the deThe perpetration
English Parliament.
fendant falls within any one or more of
of frauds, and fhe proof of fraudulent
the classes of contracts enumerated. But
rights of action of many kinds (often
it ceases to apply as soon as that promise
alleged to have been created so long beof the defendant has been performed;
fore that those originally involved were and of course never applies to a suit
frequently shown to have died or left
filed on a contract when the only part
the country, or, if alive, to have lost all
of the contract falling within the Statute
recollection of the transaction) amounted
is the undertaking of the plaintiff. This
to nothing less than a public scandal,
is so whether plaintiff has performed or
not; for if he has performed, the contract
which assumed constantly greater prois no longer bilateral; and if lie has not,
portions during the stormy days of the
latter part of the reign of Charles I (who
he has waived the Statute by suing upon
lost his head figuratively about 1630, and
the contract, and a judgment in the suit
literally in 1649), and of the period of
will of course extinguish (by merger, if
the Commonwealth (1649-1660).
plaintiff wins, and by estoppel, if he
The
loses) all the plaintiff's rights in the conStatute of Frauds was enacted in 1677,
and dealt with many more or less untract as such.
related subjects, such as trusts, estates
The statute is inapplicable to all quasiper autre vie, wills, judgments, execucontracts, for by their very definition
tions, the enrollment of recognizances,
they acquire their enforceability by operaand contracts.
tion of law, and not from the assent of
Sections 4 and 17 of the Act (as
the parties. In fact, they are frequently
amended about 1828) provide that cerapplied even against the express dissent
tain classes of contracts therein enumof the defendant; and mutuality is never
erated, although provable at common law
a legal requisite of such obligations.
by parol, should be unenforceable (sec.
They are ternied contracts only by cour4) or void (sec. 17, sales of goods) untesy, and in order to give the plaintiff
less evidenced by a written instrument
the right to site upon them in a contract
signed by defendant, or, in the case of
action. The statute is also inapplicable
sales of goods, unless accompanied or
to obligations created by statute, even
followed by certain part performance by
though the law requires them to be writat least one of the parties thereto.
ten and signed by the parties, or at least
This Statute is usually held not to be
by the obligor; for although the written
a part of the common law of the states
instrument usually in itself constitutes
comprising this nation; but statutes of
a sufficient memorandum, it does not alsimilar effect have been enacted in pracways do so (for instance, in such juristically all states.
dictions as require the consideration, or
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mutuality, to be recited); and in any
event, the obligor is bound because he
has signed at the behest of the law itself,
and not because induced to doso by the
obligee..
The statute is almost always held to
be a procedural, and not a substantive.
requirement.
A claim that it applies,
and that plaintiff has not shown that
the contract complies with it, is in all
such cases a technical defense, and not
one going to the merits.
When asserted by a defendant who is not
estopped from asserting it, the statute
merely bars plaintiff's remedy.
Plaintiff loses because he has not properly
proven his right, not because it does
not exist. It may be asserted by a defendant whenever the plaintiff, in any
form of civil action, must (allege and)
prove, as a substantive part of his cause
of action, a verbal executory promise by
defendant falling within the statute;
and the proper assertion by defendant of
the statute as a special defense imposes
on plaintiff the burden of proving compliance w ith the statute. If plaintiff cannot do this. he loses.
A defendant cannot set tip a verbal
promise by plaintiff falling within the
statute, as a defense, set-off, or counterclaim to a suit by plaintiff on a contract
not within the statute. In other words.
contracts falling within the statute, and
not complying with it. cannot be made
a matter of either demand or defense.
But several well considered cases hold.
and it would seem to be good law, that
a defendant may do so. if his object and
purpose in so doing is merely to show
that the cause of action stied upon by
plaintiff never existed, or that if it did
exist, it has since been terminated or
discharged.
In other words, a prior
contract may be discharged by being
replaced, by way of substitution or novation, by a subsequent contract, although the latter be unenforceable because within the statute.
Except where the statute renders such
contracts void. the law is definitely settled that if applicable it is a matter of
special defense, and that the Court will
not apply it unless defendant asserts it.
The statute, as a defense, is waived by
the defendant failing to assert it in the
trial court. The various means of assertion differ somewhat
in different
jurisdictions.
Sometimes it may be by
demurrer. It is always proper to do so
by special plea, filed in addition to such
,leas as defendant sees fit to interpose
the merits, such as non assumpsit,

non est factum, nil debet, etc. However, a mere objection to the introduction
of verbal proof thereof, or a motion to
direct at the close of plaintiff's case, or
of all the evidence, or in arrest of judgment, after verdict for plaintiff, is generally not sufficient. But it cannot be
asserted by defendant except in reference to the proof offered by plaintiff of
defendant's own executory promise.
Being a personal defense, and in that
respect similar to infancy, usury, etc.,
it can be asserted only by the promisor,
or by those in privity with him, i.e., his
assignees, grantees, heirs, or personal
representatives. No principle under this
subject is more firmly fixed than that
the statute cannot be asserted by a third
party. This is a logical and necessary
corollary of the preceding rules, for the
reason that the maker of the promise
should be left free to assert or waive
the statute, as he sees fit.
In other
words, it is nothing with which outsiders should be permitted to concern themselves, or by which outsiders should be
permitted to benefit. Under certain circumstances of estoppel hereinafter outlined, the court will sometimes refuse to
permit a promisor to assert the statute
as a defense, even though it is clearly
applicable.
Care should be exercised to distinmguish between (1) performance that renders the statute inapplicable, (2) performance that complies with the statute, and
(3) performance that impels the courts
to refuse to permit the promisor to interpose the statute as a defense. (1) Of
course full performance of the contract
avoids the statute entirely. And "by the
same token," full performance of that
part of the contract which was originally within the statute also avoids it.
The reason in each case is. that the stattite is aimed only at executory contracts,
i.e., at unperformed promises, of the
kinds enumerated.
The very language
of the statute: "no action shall be
brought * * * whereby to charge * * *
the defendant * * * upon any promise"
makes this clear. (2) Most statutes as
to the sale of goods (even in England,
where the old statute has been superseded bv the well-known Sale of Goods
Act of 1893) render such contracts voidable only, and not void. and in all such
jurisdictions, part performance by either
party (i.e., a part payment by buyer, or
part delivery by the seller) is just as satisfactory a compliance as a memo, and
is expressly made an alternative method

of compliance.
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(3) But with these two exceptions, it
should be clearly understood that no
performance by plaintiff, partial or
complete, and no partial performance by
defendant, is such a compliance with
the statute as will prevent it from still
being applicable to the remaining proinise, if the statute originally applied
thereto.
In other words, a defendalt
may perform part of his promise of
guaranty, or part of his promise made
in
consideration
of
marriage (evnIt
though such part performance lie celebration of the marriage ceremony), or
part of his promise not to be performed
within one year, or part of his promise
to convey lands, without thereby so satisfying the statute that it is not applicable to his obligation to perform the balance. Two important and substantially
different rules of law are so available to
the promisee in such cases that the foregoing principle, as such, may be said to
be unqualified.
These two principles,
constituting a real "first aid to the injured," are, respectively, quasi-contract
and equitable estoppel, or constructive
fraud.
It is a rule of substantive law, and of
very general application, that whenever
one person has willingly or unwillingly
conferred upon another a benefit without compensation, and under circumstances negativing gratuity, which beniefit defendant still enjoys and retains,
and which it is unfair for the latter to
retain without paying for, the law holds
him bound to make reasonable compensation therefor, and imputes to him an
obligation to pay the former. Among
other instances in which this principle is
applied are those where the benefit was
conferred under a contract originally unenforceable (e.g., within the Statute of
Frauds) as well as where the express
contract though originally enforceable,
has become vnenforceable because of
such events as subsequent illegality or
subsequent impossibility. And so, if any
plaintiff has, in performance of an express contract between himself and defendant, conferred benefits upon the defendant which defendant retains but has
not paid for and which he should pay for
but refuses to pay for, and if defendant
has, or can, successfully assert the Statute of Frauds as a defense to suit on the
express contract, such plaintiff may,
upon filing a suit, or additional counts,
based on quasi-contract, compel the defendant to pay the reasonable value of
such benefit. A defendant cannot assert
the statute as a defense to such a suit,

for the statute does not apply to such
obligations, as heretofore mentioned.
This reniedy is adequate for the recovery

of money paid, services rendered, and
other similar benefits conferred in promises other than sales of goods, to which
it does not apply because the conferring
of any benefit in such cases could be
done only by part performance, which
would be a compliance with the statute
and would deprive defendant of that defense in a suit on the express contract.
Volumes have been written on the
principle of estoppel, and innumerable
cases have turned upon the application
of this salutary and wholesome doctrine.
It is a doctrine not limited to courts of
equity. A mere refusal by a defendant
to perform his verbal promise that falls
within the statute and has not complied
with it,

is, per se insufficient

to justify

the court in holding him estopped from
asserting the statute as a defense to a
suit on the express contract. Otherwise
the statute could be rendered nugatory
in any given case. And a court will not
invoke estoppel when plaintiff, although
defeated in a suit on the express contract, has an adequate remedy on quasicontract.
But it occasionally happens
that even a quasi-contract action will not
afford a proper remedy; in fact, sometimes it appears that a quasi-contract
action will not lie, e.g., in cases where
the damage done to the plaintiff is not
that lie has conferred benefits on defendant, but that he has lost profits from
performance offered but not accepted.
Estoppel

in

pals,

naniely,

equitable

estoppel, or estoppel by conduct (or
constructive fraud, if you prefer the
term) exists whenever a defendant, by
his previous acts or conduct, has induced
the plaintiff, in reasonable reliance thereon, so to act or forbear in performing
or preparing to perform a contract unenforceable against the defendant because of the statute, that by so doing
plaintiff has lost rights other than those
created by the contract in question, or
has otherwise so changed or altered his
position that he cannot be restored to
the position and rights he possessed at
the time of the creation of the contract.
Of course it should appear that defendant requested plaintiff so to act, or at
least knew, or should reasonably have
known, that plaintiff would do so. If a
plaintiff has been irretrievably prejudiced
tinder these circumstances, the court will
hold defendant estopped from asserting
the statute as a defense, and plaintiff mayi
proceed against defendant on the meri.
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of the express contract. On principle,
this doctrine of estoppel is applicable to
any class of contract falling within the
statute, and except as to lands, it may
arise even though neither plaintiff nor
defendant has made any part performance. The doctrine of estoppel and the
remedy of quasi-contract are mutually
exclusive, estoppel being invoked only in
suits on the express contract, while quasi-contract actions are not brought on
the express contract. And estoppel will
not be invoked if plaintiff's rights consist merely of a claim for benefits conferred, for in such cases a quasi-contract
action will afford sufficient relief. But
courts of equity may nevertheless grant
specific'performance in land contracts.
It remains to mention the practical application of estoppel to the particular
kinds of contracts falling within the
statute.
(1) It is inapplicable to all cases of
sales of goods; for it would seem impossible to have elements of prejudicial
change of position. Goods or materials
contracted for by a seller in and about
performance may be sold on the market,
if indeed the seller has not an opportunity to cancel his order; or they may be
used by him in performing other pending contracts.
(2) It is inapplicable to promises of
guaranty, at least unless plaintiff in reliance thereon has to the knowledge of
the defendant surrendered all or some of
his rights against the principal debtor.
In the absence of such facts, there is no
prejudicial or irretrievable change of
position. Plaintiff is no better off, but
on the other hand he is no worse off.
He has lost only his rights against the
guarantor. That is not enough to constitute grounds of estoppel.
(3) The doctrine of estoppel is not
invoked in contracts within the so-called
3iarriage clause. Although plaintiff may
-have married in reliance on defendant's
promise, neither will the marriage be dissolved nor will damages be assessed for
a breach of the verbal promise of the
defendant to convey or deliver money or
property. The public policy recognizing
marriage as not only a contract, but also
a status, and frowning upon the acquisition of property rights as a primary motive or inducement of marriage, is probably the reason for this attitude of the
courts. Of course, if the subject-matter
is real property, the circumstances may
be such that specific performance is justified, and if so, that relief will be granted
in equity although marriage was the consideration for the promise.

29

is applicable, under
Estoppel
(4)
proper facts, to contracts not to be performed within the space of one year
from the time of the making thereof,
where plaintiff's claim is based on something other than merely services rendered thereunder, and not paid for. For
the latter, of course, quasi-contract affords sufficient remedy. But if, for example, as in Seymour vs. Oelrichs (156
Cal. 782; 106 Pac. 88; 134 Am. St. Rep.
154) the claim is for compensation for
services not yet rendered, and if plaintiff shows that he has lost valuable
rights, at the request of and to the
knowledge of defendant in resigning
permanent employment elsewhere in order to be in a position to perform a
verbal ten-year employment by defendant, defendant is clearly estopped.
A careful perusal of the opinion in
the Seymour case above cited, and of the
authorities therein referred to, is recommended. It will be noted that in many
cases the grounds for invoking the rule,
and for overruling defendant's assertion
of the statute, are called fraud rather
than estoppel.
It should be borne in
mind that the court is referring to constructive rather than actual fraud. Of
course a defrauder, in the real sense of
the term, is estopped, under facts that
have caused plaintiff to be prejudiced in
the manner above outlined; but in cases
involving the problem as to whether the
defense of the statute should be overruled, the courts are not concerned with
the defendant's intention, but with the
results that have followed, and been
caused by, his conduct. And so a defendant will be precluded from asserting
that defense despite his entire innocence
of any tortious or fraudulent intent, and
despite the fact that his conduct may
have been merely the making of a
promise, or the statement of a future
fact, or without any intent to deceive,
even though such act would clearly fall
short of actionable, tortious fraud.
It
would seem better therefore to describe
all instances in which the -courts refuse
to permit the statute to be asserted, although not complied with, as cases of
estoppel, or to call them cases of constructive fraud.
(5) Promises to sell, exchange, devise,
and give land are all within the statute,
and are fruitful sources of litigation.
They are the most frequent instances of
the application of estoppel or constructive fraud.
The typical facts are, of
course, that the promisor refuses to deliver the promised deed; and that the
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promisee desires the land, rather than a
refund of the purchase price or other
consideration which he has furnished.
The courts of equity take cognizance of
the fact that although plaintiff can be
compensated in a quasi-contract action,
yet it is not always fair to compel a
buyer of land to be satisfied with restoration to status quo; and so, courts of
equity will grant specific performance
upon proof of these facts: 1st, clear and
convincing proof of a verbal promise by
defendant to convey the land in question to the complainant; and, delivery of
possession by defendant to complainant,
pursuant to and in recognition of his
verbal promise; 3rd, payment or tender
of the purchase price, or (in cases of
promises to give or devise the land), the
making of valuable improvements by
complainant after possession taken.
In
iractical application of the well-known
saying that actions speak louder than
words, the court of equity will always
say, that any conduct is fraud which
results in defrauding another, regardless
of tl
ppresence or absence of intent to
deceive or other improper ulterior inotive; that such results always offend a
covirt of good conscience: and that if
such a court can prevent sulh results by
depriving a defendant of a mrc technical and procedural defense and orlering himi to proceed to ierfriim. it will do
So unhesitatingly whel

voked when plaintiff can be compensated
in quasi-contract, is not closely adhered
to by courts of equity in land contracts;
for the only classes of land contracts in
which the promisee is damaged further
than by the conferring of benefits on the
promisor would seem to be those in
which the promisee moves into physical
possession, perhaps with his family, ant
occupies the land in question as his home
or factory or warehouse. But the 3 elements above named cover a range of
land contracts much broader in scope.
In conclusion, it should be said that
the statute applies to alternative promises, if either alternative is within its
scope. Defendant may deliberately elect
to do the thing within the statute, and
then refuse to perform on the grounds
of the applicability of the statute.
If an entire and indivisible or unapportionable consideration supports two
promises, one of which is within the
statute, the statute is a defense to the
whole contract, and defendant cannot be
held to either protnise. Of course if the
considcration is divisible or apportionable, the court will sever the contract
into its coimponent -ji-ts, and will apply
the statute only to ,t
portion of the
contract of which the promise is within
its Scoen. fBit a sale of a hill of goods
is witini the statute if its aggregate purchase price equals or exceeds the statlitory anlount, even thou
it consist of
severable items all of which are priced
at a Still below tile Statultory amount.
PIM)F. \VM. G. WOOD.

the circ'tinstatices

appeal so strongly to fairness al cqtnity.
The elasticitv of time doctrine of estoppel or conimtructi;e fraud, mrtici;lriy in
courts of equity. is eIl deinonstralted 1)'
this attitde of coirts of" Se' ial n1, iis' ;
to Coivev landi.
It is (N tIimla d, of
course, by the- fact that land is tile one
Criiilodity r, tle iniimrlet in which every
article (i.e.. 1ver'y tract of lund) is ,ifferc.".t; that no two tracts of" land have
esm-tiv the same cliaraetcritics: and
anvone ss'ho goes so far as to givc possm.0sion and accept the plrclase
w-icP or

ildice time pronlisee to lllIic ;mmable
ilmprov'ments oi the laud. Ileliuvilg it to
be his. is really guiltv of frauid, rcegardless of the fact that his decision to refuse the deed may not have been conceived until after giving possession.
It
seems clear that the statemlent heretofore made, that estoppel will not he in-

THE LIBRARY
The library has r-ecUtly acquired sevcral nilortant texts and reference hooks
which Shouhl be of great
aitle to the
student.
Aniong the tiost noteworthy
of these are a Cllpllete set of I'age on
imeLaw
of (,mntracts. a full set of Wigmorte I'l vidIcle. and a comilplete set of
(;,ay's ( .'ss ol Prolerty.
I
i\ntIhr vcry vhaliable acquisition is a
new Quick Serch Manual, (lesigned for
Ilse in c(nllcction with (olttis Jris(_'yc.\With the aid of this Manial, the
tedious labor involved in a search for
cases exactly ill point is ,llillinlized to a
re,, ar'ltlIe
well

to

dleg

e.

ilnv'slilte

St1deIts Iwill

(10

p)ossibilities

of-

the

fered by their College T.ibrary.
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MAX'S SMOKE SHOP
WE CARRY ALL BRANDS OF
CIGARS AND CIGARETTES

A Smoke for Every Taste
Everything for Smokers
MAX'S SMOKE SHOP
300 W. Madison Street

(Two Doors South of the School)

POST GRADUATE

NOTES

The Post Graduate students began
their work on October 4th with an attendance of eighteen, several of whom
have already been admitted to the Bar.
On Monday of each week, Mr. Jackson
has charge of what the members of the
class call "Thesis Night," on which
night four members of the class discuss
a particular phase of the subject or topic
they have chosen for their thesis. After
a member of the class finishes his discussion, the other members of the class
test his knowledge of the particular subject by asking him questions.
If the
member of the class is able to answer
the questions asked of him, all well and
good, but if he is unable to do so, he
always has that good standby, "I expect to go further into that matter in
my subsequent discussions."
On Wednesday nights of each week,
Dean Burke unravels the law beginning
with the Code of Hammurabi and coming down through the ages until at the
end of this semester, we expect to complete the course with the Illinois Con-

Cor. Franklin

stitution of 1870, which is now in force.
This course is very interesting and instructive, inasmuch as it shows us where
our present laws, or .t'least the most
important of them, originated and why
such laws were brought into existence.
On Friday night of each week, we
again have Mr. Jackson, but this time he
instructs us in the practical side of common law pleading. Each week the members of this course prepare some kind of
declaration or plea, which declaration or
plea sets tip some caus.e of action or defense which is used in the courts every
day. Some member is called upon to
read his declaration or plea, as the case
may be, and after the reading thereof,
Mr. Jackson and the class have a general discussion of the points involved,
showing the particular person where he
has erred in his pleadings and making
suggestions to him, and in addition taking into consideration various statutory
matters bearing on the particular case.
This course is without a doubt well
worthy of any graduate student's time.
J. Bertram Levie, '26.

